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In this paper, we consider a primal–dual inﬁnite linear program-
ming problem-pair, i.e. LPs on inﬁnite dimensional spaces with
inﬁnitely many constraints. We present two duality theorems for
the problem-pair: a Weak and a Strong Duality Theorem. We
do not assume any topology on the vector spaces, therefore our
results are algebraic duality theorems. As an application, we con-
sider transferable utility cooperative games with arbitrarily many
players.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider LP problems on inﬁnite dimensional spaces with inﬁnitely many con-
straints. We take pure vector spaces over the real ﬁeld, i.e. we do not assume any topological structure
on them. We present a Weak and a Strong Duality Theorem in this setting. From the proofs of these
results it can be deduced that not only the ﬁnite dimensional statement can be generalized, but the
concept of the proof of the ﬁnite case as well. In this sense our results elucidate that theWeak and the
Strong Duality Theorem are for inﬁnite problems, so it is natural to discuss them in such a setting.
Ref. [6] contains the ﬁrst complete proof of the Strong Duality Theorem for ﬁnite LPs. It is worth
to mention that Ref. [6] used the Strong Duality Theorem to prove the minimax theorem of zero-
sum, two-person games. About duality theorems and results for inﬁnite LPs [2] provides a thorough
overview. Moreover, some of the papers, we consider when we discuss applications, refer to Ref. [5].
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As an application we present a result for transferable utility cooperative games with arbitrarily
many players. In cooperative game theory perhaps the most important solution concept is the core
[7]. In the ﬁnitely many player case the Bondareva–Shapley theorem, see [3,13], provides a necessary
and sufﬁcient condition for the non-emptiness of the core, it states that the core of a given game is
non-empty if and only if the given game is balanced. The textbook proof of the Bondareva–Shapley
theorem goes by the Strong Duality Theorem, see e.g. [10].
The most important previous results on this ﬁeld are as follows: Ref. [11] proves a Bondareva–
Shapley theorem type result for arbitrarily many player games and so does [8] for the countably many
player case (the latter result is based on Ref. [5]). Ref. [9] gives an overview on the Bondareva–Shapley
theorem type results for both the ﬁnitely and the inﬁnitely many player settings.
In this paper, we generalize the Bondareva–Shapley theorem for games with arbitrarily many
players differently from that the above papers do. Our result is line with the ﬁnitely many player
case result, i.e. we apply a purely algebraic argument, the purely algebraic Strong Duality Theorem.
We also discuss [12]’s result on exact games in the same vein as we do [11]’s. We show that the
ﬁnitelymanyplayer characterization that Ref. [4] presents canbegeneralized into the settingdescribed
in the previous paragraph. Again, this result is also an application of the purely algebraic duality
theorems.
The setup of the paper is as follows: in the next section we provide the algebraic duality theorems
and in the last section we apply those to transferable utility cooperative games with arbitrarily many
players.
2. Algebraic duality theorems
Notation: For any vector space X, X∗ denotes its algebraic dual, i.e. X∗ is for the set of the linear
functionals on X . For any linear mapping A : X → Y, A∗ is for its adjoint mapping, i.e. A∗ : Y∗ → X∗
is such that ∀x ∈ X,∀y ∈ Y∗ : y(A(x)) = A∗(y) (x). Moreover, for any (real) vector space X, C ⊆ X is
a convex cone, if ∀x, y ∈ C,∀α,β ∈ R+: αx + βy ∈ C.
Let f : X → R and g : X → R be arbitrary functions, and A ⊆ X be an arbitrary set. Then f A g
if ∀x ∈ A : f (x) g(x). If f and g are linear functionals and X is a coordinate space, then f  g means
∀x ∈ X+ : f (x) g(x).
Let X be a vector space and A ⊆ X be an arbitrary set. Then Lin(A) is for the vector space spanned
by A, i.e. it is the smallest vector space which contains A.
First we provide the problem-pair we consider in this section.
Deﬁnition 1. Let X, Y be vector spaces, A : X → Y be a linearmapping, C ⊆ X be a convex cone, b ∈ Y
and c be a linear functional on X , i.e. c ∈ X∗. Consider the following problems:
(P) c(x) → sup
A(x) = b
x ∈ C
(D) y(b) → inf
A∗(y) C c
y ∈ Y∗
. (1)
We say (P)/(D) has an optimal solution if supA(x)=b, x∈C c(x)/ infA∗(y) Cc y(b) is ﬁnite, i.e.
supA(x)=b, x∈C c(x) ∈ R/ infA∗(y)C c y(b) ∈ R.
The above (P)–(D)problem-pair is a straightforward inﬁnite reformulationof thewell-knownﬁnite
(dimensional) primal–dual problem-pair. It is worth noticing that since we do not impose any order
on the vector space Y , without loss of generality we cannot give the canonical form (containing only
inequalities) of the primal problem.
Next we consider a Weak Duality Theorem.
Theorem 2 (Weak Duality Theorem). Consider the problem-pair of (1). Then ∀x ∈ X,∀y ∈ Y∗ such that
x and y are feasible solutions of (P) and (D), respectively:
c(x) y(b) .
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Proof. From the deﬁnition of an adjoint mapping: ∀x ∈ X,∀y ∈ Y∗ : A∗(y) (x) = y(A(x)). From the
constraints ∀x ∈ X,∀y ∈ Y∗ such that x and y are feasible solutions of (P) and (D), respectively:
c(x) A∗(y) (x)
and
A∗(y) (x) = y(A(x)) = y(b) .
Summing up, ∀x ∈ X,∀y ∈ Y∗ such that x and y are feasible solutions of (P) and (D), respectively:
c(x) y(b). 
The following theorem is well-known, its proof can be found e.g. in [1, Theorem 5.46, pp. 188–189].
Theorem 3 (Basic Separating Hyperplane Theorem). Let X be a vector space and A, B be disjoint convex
sets of X such that A has an internal point.1 Then there is a non-zero linear functional properly separating
A and B.
The following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 4 (Strong Duality Theorem). Consider the problem-pair of (1), moreover, assume that C has an
internal point. Then one and only one of the following alternatives is always true:
1. (P) and (D) have optimal solutions and supA(x)=b, x∈C c(x) = infA∗(y)C c y(b).
2. (P) has no feasible solution, and (D)’s feasibility set is not empty and its objective function is
unbounded on it.
3. (P)’s feasibility set is not empty and its objective function is unbounded on it, and (D) has no feasible
solution.
4. Both (P) and (D) have no feasible solution.
Proof. Point 1: Assume that (P) has an optimal solution, and let z > supA(x)=b, x∈C c(x) be
arbitrarily ﬁxed. Furthermore, let d(b, z) and B : X → Y × R be a mapping such that ∀x ∈ X :
B(x)(A(x), c(x)).
Then d /∈ B(C) and B(C) is a convex set. Two cases can happen: (1) d ∈ Lin(B(C)). In this case, since
C has an internal point, B(C) also has an internal point in Lin(B(C)), therefore we can apply Theorem
3 and get g a non-zero linear functional on Lin(B(C)) such that ∀x ∈ B(C) : g(x) 0 and g(d) 0. It is
clear that g can be extended onto Y × R, and let f be such an extension of g.
(2) d /∈ Lin(B(C)). In this case let f be a linear functional on Y × R such that ∀x ∈ Lin(B(C)) :
f (x) = 0 and f (d) = −1 (it is clear that there is such a linear functional).
Then ∃β ∈ R\{0} such that ∀x ∈ C:
f (B(x)) = f ((A(x), c(x))) = f ((A(x), 0)) + f ((0, c(x)))f |Y (A(x)) + βc(x) 0 (2)
and
f (d) = f ((b, z)) = f ((b, 0)) + f ((0, z)) = f |Y (b) + βz  0 , (3)
where f |Y is the restriction of f on Y × {0}, so f |Y is a linear functional on Y .
Since the primal problem (P) has a feasible solution, ∃x′ ∈ C such that A(x′) = b and c(x′) < z. By
putting x′ into the inequalities (2) and (3) we get that β < 0.
Let y0− f |Yβ . Then y0 is a linear functional on Y, y0(A(x)) = A∗(y0) (x) implies that A∗(y0)C c,
i.e. the feasibility set of (D) is not empty, and y0(b) z.
1 For the deﬁnition of an internal point see e.g. [1, 5.45 Deﬁnition, pp. 188].
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Summing up the discussion above, from the Weak Duality Theorem (Theorem 2) we get
sup
x∈C, A(x)=b
c(x) inf
y∈Y∗ , A∗(y)C c
y(b) y0(b) z .
z was arbitrary ﬁxed, therefore
sup
x∈C, A(x)=b
c(x) = inf
y∈Y∗ , A∗(y)C c
y(b) .
Finally, assume that (D) has an optimal solution. If (P) has a feasible solution, then its objective
function is bounded above (see the Weak Duality Theorem (Theorem 2)), therefore (P) also has an
optimal solution and we can apply the above reasoning.
It is also clear from the above discussion that the following two cases cannot happen: (1) (P) has
an optimal solution and (D) has no feasible solution, (2) (D) has an optimal solution and (P) has no
feasible solution (in this case we can choose z as an arbitrary negative number).
Points 2 and 3: From the Weak Duality Theorem (Theorem 2) if (P)’s / (D)’s objective function is
not bounded, then (D)/(P) cannot have any feasible solution, and if (P)/(D) has a feasible solution,
then the objective function of (D)/(P) cannot be unbounded.
Point 4: It is left for the reader. 
Remark 5. In the above theoremwe have assumed that C has an internal point. From the proof above
we can conclude that it is possible to weaken this assumption. It is enough to assume that for any
z > supA(x)=b, x∈C c(x) : B(C) and d can be properly separated by a non-zero linear functional.
3. An application
Notation: LetN, the player set be an arbitrary non-empty set,A ⊆ P(N)be aﬁeld and v : A → Rbe
a mapping such that v(∅) = 0. Then v is called transferable utility (TU) cooperative game (henceforth
game) with player set (N,A). Furthermore, let G(N,A) denote the class of games with player set (N,A),
and a(A) be for the set of additive set functions on ﬁeld A. Finally, for any S ⊆ N: χS denotes the
characteristic function of set S.
Deﬁnition 6. The core [7] of game v ∈ G(N,A) is deﬁned as follows:
Core(v){μ ∈ a(A)|∀A ∈ A : μ(A) v(A) and μ(N) = v(N)} .
In other words, the core of a game is the set of allocations such that (1) the total value of the grand
coalition is allocated and (2) no coalition has an incentive to deviate.
Deﬁnition 7. Game v ∈ G(N,A) is balanced, if
sup
λ∈ΛA , ∑A∈Aλ λAχA=1
∑
A∈Aλ
λAv(A) v(N) ,
where ΛA{λ ∈ RA+||{A ∈ A|λA > 0}| < ∞} and Aλ{A ∈ A|λA /= 0}.
In cooperative game theory, perhaps themost important solution concept is the core. In the ﬁnitely
many player case the Bondareva–Shapley theorem, see [3,13], provides a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for the non-emptiness of the core, it states that the core of a given game v is non-empty if
and only if v is balanced. The textbook proof of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem goes by the Strong
Duality Theorem, see e.g. [10]. The primal problem belongs to the concept of balancedness and the
dual problem belongs to the non-emptiness of the core.
In the case of arbitrarily many players [11] proves a Bondareva–Shapley theorem type result and
so does [8] for the countably many player case. The proofs of these results, however, are based on
topological concepts.
The next theorem is a generalized and non-topological Bondareva–Shapley theorem type result.
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Theorem 8. For any v ∈ G(N,A): Core(v) /= ∅ if and only if v is balanced.
Proof. Consider the (P)–(D) problem-pair of (1), where
(i) XLin(ΛA ∪ {1}), where 1 is the constant 1 function on A.
(ii) v is a linear functional deﬁned as follows: for any x ∈ ΛA : v(x)∑A∈Ax xAv(A), and v(1) = 0.
(iii) YLin
({∑
A∈Ax xAχA|x ∈ ΛA
})
, i.e. the elements of Y are linear combinations of ﬁnitely many
characteristic functions on sets of A. Therefore the elements of Y are A-measurable functions
and Y is a vector space.
(iv) CX+, 1 is an internal point of set C.
(v) A : X → Y is a linear mapping deﬁned as follows: ∀x ∈ ΛA : A(x)∑A∈Ax χAxA, and A(1) =
0Y . Notice that, for any x ∈ X : x = x′ + α1, where x′ ∈ Lin(ΛA) and α ∈ R.
(vi) It is easy to verify that Y∗ = a(A).
(vii) A∗ is deﬁned as follows: ∀y ∈ Y∗: let A∗(y) be a linear functional such that for any x ∈ ΛA :
A∗(y) (x) ∫ x dy, and A∗(1) = 0. Then for any x ∈ X , where x = x′ + α1 (see point (v)), for any
y ∈ Y∗:
y(A(x)) =
∫ ∑
A∈Ax′
χAx
′
A dy =
∑
A∈Ax′
∫
χAx
′
A dy =
∑
A∈Ax′
y(A)x′A = A∗(y) (x).
Therefore A∗ is the adjoint of A.
(viii) bχN , i.e. b1.
(ix) cv ∈ G(N,A).
Core(v) /= ∅ if and only if (D) has an optimal solution and that is not greater than v(N).
v is balanced if and only if (P) has an optimal solution and that is not greater than v(N) (see points
(ii) an (v)).
We can apply point 1 of the Strong Duality Theorem (Theorem 4). 
In Deﬁnition 6 we have deﬁned the core as a set of certain additive set functions. It is possible,
however, to generalize the above concept so that the core, call it σ -core consists of σ -additive set
functions. Then the non-emptiness of the σ -core would mean that the (ordinary) core contains a
σ -additive element. Since in our opinion the purely algebraic duality theorems do not imply a
Bondareva–Shapley theorem type result for this generalized core concept, in this paper we do not
discuss this problem.
Notice that in the proof of Theorem 8 the vector spaces are coordinate spaces. Therefore, we
can deploy this fact and get to the following problem-pair, where A ∈ A is an arbitrary non-empty
set:
(P′) c(x) → sup
A(x) = b
xS  0 S ∈ A\{A}
xA ∈ R
(D′) y(b) → inf
A∗(y) (χS)  c(χS) S ∈ A\{A}
A∗(y) (χA) = c(χA)
y ∈ Y∗
. (4)
Since the above problem-pair is a special case of the problem-pair (1), both duality theorems, the
Weak and the Strong Duality Theorem (Theorems 2 and 4) hold for it.
Refs. [14,12] introduce the concept of exact games for the ﬁnitely many and the inﬁnitely many
player case, respectively.
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Deﬁnition 9. Game v ∈ G(N,A) is exact, if ∀A ∈ A: ∃μ ∈ Core(v) such that μ(A) = v(A).
The problem-pair (P′)–(D′) (see (4)) implies a natural generalization of the concept of balancedness
(see Deﬁnition 7) introduced in Ref. [4]:
Deﬁnition 10. Game v ∈ G(N,A) is exactly balanced, if
sup
λ∈ΛeA , ∑A∈Aλ λAχA=1
∑
A∈Aλ
λAv(A) v(N) ,
where ΛeA{λ ∈ RA||{A ∈ A|λA > 0}| < ∞ and |{A ∈ A|λA < 0}| 1} and Aλ{A ∈ A|λA /= 0}.
Then we can generalize Ref. [12] in the direction of that we do not use any topology in the proof,
and Ref. [4] in the direction that there can be arbitrarily many players in the game, and we get the
following result:
Theorem 11. For any v ∈ G(N,A): v is exact if and only if v is exactly balanced.
Proof. Apply the proof of Theorem 8 to the problem-pair (4). 
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